We define and discuss several notions of potential functions for games in strategic form. We characterize games that have a potential function, and we present a variety of applications. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a symmetric oligopoly Cournot competition with linear cost functions c i (q i ) = cq i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The inverse demand function, F(Q), Q > 0, is a positive function (no monotonicity, continuity, or differentiability assumptions on F are needed). The profit function of Firm i is defined on R n ++ as i (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) = F(Q)q i − cq i , where Q = n j=1 q j . Define a function P: R n ++ −→ R: P(q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) = q 1 q 2 · · · q n (F(Q) − c).
For every Firm i, and for every q −i ∈ R n−1
A function P satisfying (1.1) is called an ordinal potential, and a game that possesses an ordinal potential is called an ordinal potential game. Clearly, the purestrategy equilibrium set of the Cournot game coincides with the pure-strategy equilibrium set of the game in which every firm's profit is given by P. A condition stronger than (1.1) is required if we are interested in mixed strategies. Consider a quasi-Cournot competition 1 with a linear inverse demand function F(Q) = a − bQ, a, b > 0, and arbitrary differentiable cost functions c i (q i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Define a function P * ((q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n )) as P * ((q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n )) = a It can be verified that For every Firm i, and for every q −i ∈ R n−1
(1.3)
A function P * satisfying (1.3) will be called a potential function. 2, 3 The equalities (1.3) imply that the mixed-strategy equilibrium set of the quasi-Cournot game coincides with the mixed-strategy equilibrium set of the game obtained by replacing every payoff function by P * . In particular, firms that are jointly trying to maximize the potential function P * (or the ordinal potential P) end up in an equilibrium. 4 We will prove that there exists at most one potential function (up to an additive constant). This raises the natural question about the economic content (or interpretation) of P * : What do the firms try to jointly maximize?
1 Negative prices are possible in this game, though the prices in any nondegenerate equilibrium will be positive. 2 In physics, P * is a potential function for ( 1 , 2 , . . . , n ) if
If the profits functions are continuously differentiable then this condition is equivalent to (1.3). 3 Slade (1993) proved the existence of a function P * satisfying (1.3) for the quasi-Cournot game. She called this function a fictitious objective function. 4 Every q * that maximizes P * is a pure-strategy equilibrium, but there may be pure-strategy equilibrium profiles that are just "local" maximum points, and there may be mixed-strategy equilibrium profiles as well. Therefore, the argmax set of the potential can be used as a refinement tool for potential games (this issue is discussed in Section 5). Neyman (1991) showed that if the potential function is concave and continuously differentiable, then every mixed-strategy equilibrium profile is pure and must maximize the potential function. Neyman's result is related by Shin and Williamson (1994) to the concept of "simple equilibrium outcome" in Bayesian games.
We do not have an answer to this question. However, it is clear that the mere existence of a potential function helps us (and the players) to better analyze the game.
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In this paper we will prove various properties of potential games, and we will provide simple methods for detecting them and for computing their potential functions.
To our knowledge, the first to use potential functions for games in strategic form was Rosenthal (1973) . Rosenthal defined the class of congestion games and proved, by explicitly constructing a potential function, that every game in this class possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium. The class of congestion games is, on the one hand, narrow, but on the other hand, very important for economics. Any game where a collection of homogeneous agents have to choose from a finite set of alternatives, and where the payoff of a player depends on the number of players choosing each alternative, is a congestion game. We will show that the class of congestion games coincides (up to an isomorphism) with the class of finite potential games.
Recently, much attention has been devoted to several notions of "myopic" learning processes. We show that for generic finite games, the existence of an ordinal potential is equivalent to the convergence to equilibrium of the learning process defined by the one-sided better reply dynamic. The new learning literature raised a new interest in the Fictitious Play process in games in strategic form defined by Brown (1951) . It was studied for zero-sum games by Robinson (1951) and for non-zero-sum games by Miyasawa (1961) , Shapley (1964) , Deschamps (1973) , and lately by Krishna (1991) , Milgrom and Roberts (1991) , Sela (1992) , Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) , Jordan (1993) , Hofbauer (1994) , Krishna and Sjöström (1994) , Fudenberg and Levine (1994) , Monderer et al. (1994) , and others. In Monderer and Shapley (1996) we prove that the Fictitious Play process converges to the equilibrium set in a class of games that contains the finite (weighted) potential games. Milchtaich (1996) analyzed classes of games related to congestion games. His work, as well as that of Blume (1993) , indicates that ordinal potential games are naturally related to the evolutionary learning as well (see e.g., Crawford, 1991; Kandori and Rob, 1992; Young, 1993; Roth and Erev, 1995;  and the references listed therein).
As the potential function is uniquely defined up to an additive constant, the argmax set of the potential function does not depend on a particular potential function. Thus, for potential games this argmax set refines the equilibrium set, at least technically. We show that this refinement concept accurately predicts the experimental results obtained by Van Huyck et al. (1990) . We do not attempt to provide any explanation to this prediction power obtained (perhaps as a coinci-5 A similar problem is discussed by Bergstrom and Varian (1985) . dence) in this case. 6 A possible way of explaining this can be found in Blume (1993) . Blume discusses various stochastic strategy revision processes for players who have direct interaction only with small part of the population. He proves for the log-linear strategy revision process that the strategies of the players in a symmetric potential game converge to the argmax set of the potential. 7 Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) have applied potential theory to cooperative games. Except for the fact that we are all using potential theory our works are not connected. Nevertheless, we will show in the last section that combining our work with Hart and Mas-Colell's yields a surprising application to value theory. 8 The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give the basic definitions and provide several useful characterizations of finite potential and finite ordinal potential games. An equivalence theorem between potential games and congestion games is given in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss and characterize infinite potential games. Section 5 is devoted to a discussion of the experimental results of Van Huyck et al. In Section 6 we show an application of our theory to the strategic approach to cooperative games.
POTENTIAL GAMES
. . , u n ) be a game in strategic form with a finite number of players. The set of players is N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, the set of strategies of Player i is Y i , and the payoff function of Player i is 
is called an ordinal potential game if it admits an ordinal potential. Let w = (w i ) i∈N be a vector of positive numbers which will be called weights. A function P: Y → R is a w-potential for if for every i ∈ N and for every
is called a w-potential game if it admits a w-potential.
6 Crawford (1991) gave an evolutionary interpretation of these experiments' results.
7 This argmax set is assumed to be a singleton.
When we are not interested in particular weights w, we simply say that P is a weighted potential and that is a weighted potential game.
9
A function P: Y → R is an exact potential (or, in short, a potential) for if it is a w-potential for with w i = 1 for every i ∈ N . is called an exact potential game (or, in short, a potential game) if it admits a potential. For example, the matrix P is a potential for the Prisoner's Dilemma game G described below:
(1, 1) (9,0) (0,9) (6,6) , P = 4 3 3 0 .
The next lemma characterizes the equilibrium set of ordinal potential games. Its obvious proof will be omitted.
LEMMA 2.1. Let P be an ordinal potential function for (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ). Then the equilibrium set of (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ) coincides with the equilibrium set of (P, P, . .
. , P). That is, y ∈ Y is an equilibrium point for if and only if for every i
∈ N P(y) ≥ P(y −i , x) for every x ∈ Y i .
Consequently, If P admits a maximal value
10 in Y , then possesses a (purestrategy) equilibrium.
COROLLARY 2.2. Every finite ordinal potential game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium.
A path in Y is a sequence γ = (y 0 , y 1 , . . .) such that for every k ≥ 1 there exists a unique player, say Player i, such that y k = (y 
, where i is the unique deviator at step k. Hence, an improvement path is a path generated by myopic players. has the finite improvement property (FIP) if every improvement path is finite. Proof. For every improvement path γ = (y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , . . .) we have by (2.1)
As Y is a finite set, the sequence γ must be finite.
9 Using Blume's (1993) terminology we can give an equivalent definition: is a weighted potential game if and only if there exists a payoff function which is strongly best-response equivalent to each of the players' payoff functions. Sela (1992) proved that if the two-person game (A, B) does not have weakly dominated strategies, then it has a weighted potential if and only if it is better-response equivalent in mixed strategies (see Monderer and Shapley (1996) for the precise definition) to a game of the form (P, P). This result can be easily generalized to n-person games.
10 See footnote 4.
It is obvious that for finite games with the FIP, and in particular for finite ordinal potential games, every maximal improvement path must terminate in an equilibrium point. That is, the myopic learning process based on the one-sided better reply dynamic converges to the equilibrium set. However we have obtained a stronger learning result 11 :
THEOREM 2.4 (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) . Every finite weighted potential game has the Fictitious Play property.
It is interesting to note that having the FIP is not equivalent to having an ordinal potential. A counterexample is the game G 1 described below. The rows in G 1 are labeled by a and b, and the columns are labeled by c and d.
The game G 1 has the FIP, but any ordinal potential P for G 1 must satisfy the following impossible sequence of relations:
c).
A function P: Y → R is a generalized ordinal potential for if for every i ∈ N and for every y −i ∈ Y −i , and for every Proof. Let be a game with the FIP. Define a binary relation ">" on Y as follows: x > y iff x = y and there exists a finite improvement path γ with an initial point y and a terminal point x. The finite improvement property implies that ">" is a transitive relation. Let Z ⊆ Y . We say that Z is represented if there exists Q: Z → R such that for every x, y ∈ Z , x > y implies that Q(x) > Q(y). Let Z be a maximal represented subset of Y . We proceed to prove that Z = Y . Suppose x ∈ Z . If x > z for every z ∈ Z , we extend Q to Z ∪ {x} by defining Q(x) = 1 + max z∈Z Q(z), thus contradicting the maximality of Z . If z > x for every z ∈ Z , we extend Q to Z ∪ {x} by defining Q(x) = min z∈Z Q(z) − 1, contradicting again the maximality of Z . Otherwise we extend Q and contradict the maximality of Z by defining
12 COROLLARY 2.6. Let be a finite game with the FIP. Suppose in addition that for every i ∈ N and for every y
Then has an ordinal potential.
Proof. Observe that the condition on implies that every generalized ordinal potential for is an ordinal potential for . Hence, the proof follows from Lemma 2.5.
Ordinal potential games have many ordinal potentials. For exact potential games we have:
LEMMA 2.7. Let P 1 and P 2 be potentials for the game . Then there exists a constant c such that
where a 0 = y and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a i = (a
The next results characterize exact potential games in a way that resembles the standard approach to potential functions in physics.
For a finite path γ = (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y N ) and for a vector
where i k is the unique deviator at step k (i.e., y
It is a simple closed path if in addition y l = y k for every 0 ≤ l = k ≤ N −1. The length of a simple closed path is defined to be the number of distinct vertices in it. That is, the length of γ = (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y N ) is N . The proof of Theorem 2.8 is given in Appendix A. A typical simple closed path, γ , of length 4 is described below. In this path, i and j are the active players, a ∈ Y −{i, j} is a fixed strategy profile of the other players, x i , y i ∈ Y i , and 
where the points A, B, C, and D are described above.
We end this section with an important remark concerning the mixed extension of finite games. 
where = × i∈N i . Obviously, ifP: → R is a w-potential function for the mixed extension of , then its restriction to Y yields a w-potential for . As for the converse, suppose P is a w-potential for , then it can be easily verified that P is a potential for the mixed extension of , wherē
An example to an ordinal potential game whose mixed extension is not an ordinal potential game is given in Sela (1992) .
CONGESTION GAMES
Congestion games were defined by Rosenthal (1973) . They are derived from congestion models that have been extensively discussed in the literature (see e.g., Garcia and Zangwill, 1981) . Consider an illustrative example:
C In the congestion model described above, Driver a has to go from point A to point C and Driver b has to go from point B to point D. AB is called road segment 1, BC is called road segment 2, . . . etc. c j (1) denotes the payoff (e.g., the negative of the cost) for a single user of road segment j. c j (2) denotes the payoff for each user of road segment j if both drivers use road segment j. The drivers are therefore engaged in a game (the associated congestion game, CG) whose strategic form is given below (The rows are labeled by {1, 2} and {3, 4}, and the columns are labeled by {1, 3} and {2, 4}:
By Corollary 2.9 the congestion game CG admits a potential. In particular (and with no restrictions on the payoff c j (i)) it has a (pure-strategy) equilibrium. For completeness we attach below a potential P for the congestion game. The potential is computed by formula (3.2):
is defined as follows. N denotes the set of players {1, 2, . . . , n} (e.g., drivers). M denotes the set of facilities {1, 2, . . . , m} (e.g, road segments). For i ∈ N let i be the set of strategies of player i, where each A i ∈ i is a nonempty subset of facilities (e.g., a route). For j ∈ M let c j ∈ R {1,2,...,n} denote the vector of payoffs, where c j (k) denotes the payoff (e.g., the cost) to each user of facility j, if there are exactly k users.
The congestion game associated with the congestion model is the game in strategic form with the set of players N , with the sets of strategies ( i ) i∈N , and with payoff functions (v i ) i∈N defined as follows: Set = × i∈N i . For all A ∈ and for every j ∈ M let σ j (A) be the number of users of facility j. That is,
The following theorem can be deduced from Rosenthal (1973) . Proof. Let be the congestion game defined by the parameters N , M,
The proof that P is a potential for can be deduced from Rosenthal (1973) or directly using Corollary 2.9.
Let 1 and 2 be games in strategic form with the same set of players N . For k = 1, 2 let (Y i k ) i∈N be the strategy sets in k , and let (u i k ) i∈N be the payoff functions in k . We say that 1 and 2 are isomorphic if there exist bijections
where
. Every finite potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
The proof, as well as several relevant discussions, is given in Appendix B.
INFINITE POTENTIAL GAMES
Let be a game in strategic form as described in Section 2. is called a bounded game if the payoff functions (u i ) i∈N are bounded.
LEMMA 4.1. Every bounded potential game possesses an ε-equilibrium point for every ε > 0.
Proof. Note that by (2.2) every potential P for must be bounded. Let ε > 0. There exists z ∈ Y satisfying
Obviously z is an ε-equilibrium point.
Recall the concept of a path from Section 2. Let ε > 0. A path γ = (y 0 , y 1 , . . .) is an ε-improvement path with respect to if for all k ≥ 1 u i (y k ) > u i (y k−1 )+ε, where i is the unique deviator at step k. The game has the approximate finite improvement property (AFIP) if for every ε > 0 every ε-improvement path is finite. The proof of the next lemma is obvious and will be omitted. Note that for games with the AFIP, and in particular for bounded potential games, every maximal ε-improvement path terminates in an ε-equilibrium point.
A game is called a continuous game if the strategy sets are topological spaces and the payoff functions are continuous with respect to the product topology. Note that by (2.2), the potential of a continuous potential game is continuous. Therefore we have: We now proceed to deal with differentiable games. We assume that the strategy sets under discussion are intervals of real numbers. We omit the obvious proof of the next lemma. 
The next theorem is well-known (and very useful). 
is a piecewise continuously differentiable path in Y that connects z to y (i.e., x(0) = z and x(1) = y).
Consider for example the quasi-Cournot game described in the Introduction. It can be easily verified that (4.1) is satisfied (because ∂ 2 u i /∂ y i ∂ y j = a for every i = j ∈ N ), and applying (4.2) yields the potential given in (1.2). Unlike (weighted) potential games, ordinal potential games are not easily characterized. We do not know of any useful characterization, analogous to the one given in (4.1), for differentiable ordinal potential games.
THE POTENTIAL AS AN EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT TOOL
Let be a potential game and let P be a potential for . The set of all strategy profiles that maximize P is a subset of the equilibria set. By Lemma 2.7, this set does not depend on a particular potential function.
13 Thus, at least technically, the potential defines a refinement concept.
Consider the version of the Stag Hunt game of Rouseau, as described in Crawford (1991) : There are n players. Player i chooses e i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 7}. The payoff i of Player i is i (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ) = a min(e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ) − be i + c, where a > b ≥ 0, and c is a constant that guarantees positive payoffs. Define a potential function P as P(e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ) = a min(e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ) − b j j=1 e j .
Note that if a < nb, then P is maximized at the profile e with e i = 1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If a > nb, then P is maximized at the strategy profile satisfying e i = 7 for every i. Surprisingly, the equilibrium selection predicted by the argmax set of the potential is the one that is supported by the experimental results of Van Huyck et al. (1990) . In Experiment A (using Crawford's notation), a = 0.2, b = 0.1, and 14 ≤ n ≤ 16. Thus a < nb. In Experiment B, b was switched to 0, and therefore a > nb. In Experiments C d and C f , a = nb. In this case, every equilibrium profile maximizes the potential, and thus the potential cannot be used for a prediction. Indeed, in C d , the players were not using a particular equilibrium profile. In Experiment C f , which was the same as C d except for the fact that the two players were fixed (and not randomly matched), players tended to choose e 1 = e 2 = 7. This, to our opinion, reflects the principal that a repetition is a substitute to cooperation in repeated games.
We do not attempt to explain the success of the argmax set of the potential to predict behavior in the above potential game. It may be just a coincidence. 14 We hope that further experiments will be conducted to test this new refinement concept.
Van Huyck et al. (1991) conducted another set of experiments on average opinion games. In this experiments the payoff function of Player i is given by
where α, β, and γ are positive constants, and M = M(e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ) is the median of (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ).
It can be seen easily that this game does not have a weighted potential, and thus we are unable to analyze their results via the potential approach. However, if the median function M is replaced by the mean function, A(e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ) = 1/n n i=1 e i , then by Theorem 4.5 the game does have a potential. The unique strategy profile that maximizes this potential is e i = 7 for every i. Unfortunately, we do not know of any experiment conducted with the mean function A.
AN APPLICATION TO THE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO VALUE THEORY
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. For each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N we denote by G(S) the space of all cooperative games with transferable utility on the set of players S. That is, v ∈ G(S) if and only if v is a real-valued function defined on the set 2 S of subsets of S with v(∅) = 0. A solution is a function ψ :
N and for every v ∈ G(S).
For each solution ψ and for each c ∈ R N we will define a game in strategic form (ψ, c, v) for every v ∈ G(N ) as follows:
The set of players is N . The set of strategies of player i is Y i = {0, 1}. Player i can decide not to join the game (choosing 0) and to get a payoff c i , or to participate in the game (choosing 1). Let S be the set of all players that choose 1. Then each i ∈ S receives the payoff ψ(v S )(i), where v S ∈ G(S) is the restriction of v to 2 S . More precisely, for ε ∈ Y = {0, 1} N denote S(ε) = {i ∈ N : ε i = 1}. Then the payoff function u i of player i is
The games (ψ, c, v) will be called the participation games. We now present two characterizations (a local characterization and a global one) for the Shapley value in terms of the strategic properties of the participation games. (6.2) Set P(ε S ) = Q(ε S ) + i∈S c i , then Q satisfies (6.2) iff P satisfies
Thus, the proof follows from Theorem A in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) . Other results relating noncooperative potential games with cooperative solutions are discussed in Qin (1992) .
APPENDIX A
Proof of Theorem 2.8. Obviously (2) ⇒ (3) ⇒ (4). We prove that (1) ⇐⇒ (2) and that (4) ⇒ (2).
(1) ⇒ (2) Suppose P is a potential for . Let γ = (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y N ) be a closed path. Then by (2.2)
(2) ⇒ (1) Suppose I (γ , u) = 0 for every closed path γ . Fix z ∈ Y . Let y ∈ Y . We claim that for every two paths γ 1 and γ 2 that connect z to y, I (γ 1 , u) = I (γ 2 , u). Indeed, suppose γ 1 = (z, y 1 , . . . , y N ) and γ 2 = (z, z 1 , . . . , z M ), where
Then I (µ, u) = 0. Therefore I (γ 1 , u) = I (γ 2 , u). For every y ∈ Y choose a path, say γ (y), connecting z to y. Define P(y) = I (γ (y), u) for all y ∈ Y . We proceed to prove that P is a potential for . We have just proved that
for every γ that connects z to y.
Therefore P is a potential for . (4) ⇒ (2) Suppose I (γ , u) = 0 for every simple closed path γ of length 4. We denote the length of a closed path γ = (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y N ) l(γ ) (= N ). Suppose that for some closed path, say γ , I (γ , u) = 0. Obviously N = l(γ ) ≥ 5. Without loss of generality we may assume that I (µ, u) = 0 , whenever
j . Without loss of generality assume that i(0) = 1. Since i(0) = 1, and y N = y 0 , there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1 such that i( j) = 1. If j = 1 or j = N −1, we get a contradiction to the minimality assumption about the length of γ in the following way: Assume w.l.o.g. that i(1) = 1. Define µ = (y 0 , y 2 , . . . , y N ). Then, I (µ, u) = I (γ , u), and l(µ) < N . Assume therefore that 2 ≤ j ≤ N − 2. We show that there exists z j ∈ Y such that the path µ = (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y j−1 , z j , y j+1 , . . . , y N ) satisfies
and
Indeed, define
Then, by our assumption on closed paths of length 4,
This implies (A.2). Continuing recursively, we finally find a closed path τ of length N such that I (τ, u) = 0, and i(0) = i(1) = 1, in contradiction to the minimality assumption We conclude that I (γ , u) = 0 for every closed paths γ .
APPENDIX B
The payoff functions in the congestion game are given in (3.1). We need an equivalent formulation in order to prove Theorem 3.2. For A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) ∈ and for S ⊆ N we denote A(S) = ∪ i∈S A i , and we denote A(−S 
For every
where for every i ∈ N , k(i) = #Y i and k = k(1)k(2) · · · k(n). Suppose we are looking for a fixed set of facilities M with m elements and for fixed strategy sets ( i ) i∈N with # i = k(i) for every i ∈ N , such that each potential game will be represented by a congestion game with n players, with the facility set M, and with the strategy sets ( i ) i∈N . Then by Lemma B.1 each such congestion game is uniquely defined by n vectors (x i ) i∈N in R M . Suppose also that we wish the representation operation to be linear, then we must have
In the proof of Theorem 3.2, m = 2 k(1)+k(2)+···+k(n) . However, instead of M we could have defined our facility set to be either M 1 or M 2 ( the one with the greater number of elements). Hence, the number of facilities m could be reduced to
Comparing (B.7) to (B.8) indicates that it may be possible to improve upon our result.
